The German Party System(s) in 2005 -A Return to Volkspartei Dominance
Introduction
The decision by Gerhard Schröder, on the evening of Sunday 22 nd of May 2005, to call an early federal election short-circuited an electoral cycle that was due to end in
September the following year. The immediate catalyst for Schröder's decision was the SPD's anticipated -but no less shocking -defeat in that Sunday's Land elections in their heartland state of North Rhine Westphalia. There was some debate as to the rationale behind Schröder's decision (and, indeed some questioned its legality, leading to an unsuccessful challenge in the Federal Constitutional Court). For some observers, Schröder's intention was to use a highly partisan campaign (Lagerwahlkampf) in order to re-establish discipline within the SPD and head off a rebellion by the left of the party's parliamentary Fraktion. Others argued that an early election was a means of preventing the emergence of a significant competitor on the SPD's left flank by denying the PDS and the newly formed 'Electoral Initiative for Social Justice', or WASG, the time to merge and form a genuinely 'national' party.
And there were also those commentators who argued that Schröder's decision had nothing to do with such a rational calculus and that the Chancellor had either simply had enough and was effectively throwing in the towel, or alternatively was staking all on one last throw of the electoral dice.
The ultimate outcome of Schröder's decision is dealt with elsewhere in this volume and it is beyond the scope of this article to assess the strategic thinking behind the calling of early federal elections. This article intends to map out the strategic environment on the eve of the federal elections of 2005. What this article will demonstrate, however, is that -despite appearances to the contrary in May 2005 -the underlying strategic environment within which the SPD was operating was quite benign. It is true that, at the start of the federal election campaign, the SPD appeared to be in disarray and Schröder's CDU challenger Angela Merkel enjoyed a commanding lead in the opinion polls. Nevertheless it will be argued that the longer term structural attributes of the German party system(s) worked in favour of both Volksparteien -and in particular to the advantage of the SPD.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. First, the article examines the underlying socio-structural drivers of the contemporary party system in an historical context. Second, the article charts the changing constitution of the German party system(s), with an emphasis on the impact of the changes of the last 25 years including Unification. Third, the article examines in some depth the strategic environment generated by party system change and assesses its potential impact on the fortunes of the political parties. Fourth, the article pursues the logic of the previous section and looks at the impact of the strategic environment on real world outcomes at both the federal and state levels. Finally, the article summarizes the data and arguments made and what it tells us about the German party system(s) in September 2005.
The Social Base of Party Competition
Along with electoral systems and laws, political cleavages structure political competition and as a result shape party systems. Nevertheless, scholarly opinion is divided as to how these cleavages arise in the first place. Political sociologists have argued that political cleavages are underpinned by more embedded social cleavages 1 , whilst other accounts argue that cleavages are less embedded, more contingent in nature, and thus more dependant on political agency 2 . This article works from the assumption that political agency does matter and that political conflict is contingent on decisions taken by elites. However, it is also clear that these lines of conflict cannot be drawn down from the ether and that it is prudent to ground any account of the German party system(s) in its social context before focusing in more detail on contemporary developments and the current strategic environment in which political parties operate.
The notion of social cleavages is to be found in a quite diverse and contested Crucially for the purposes of this chapter, Lipset and Rokkan assume that these specific national characteristics persist and remain manifest in the warp and weft of modern party-political competition.
The Lipset-Rokkan model assumes that party competition in Europe is primarily driven by four types of cleavage conflict -between the centre and periphery, between church and state or between churches, between urban and rural interests, and between social classes. In Germany, as in many Western European countries, the dominant conflicts that have persisted over time are those of class and religion. The class cleavage is a 'horizontal' cleavage, and as such is easier to pacify than 'vertical'
cleavages such as those associated with the confessional conflict 5 . Thus in Germanyas elsewhere -post-war prosperity and the development of welfare capitalism has taken the sting out of class conflict to the extent that social class alone is no longer a reliable indicator of voter preferences 6 . It has also been recognised that voters are affected by more than one cleavage and the typical example of such 'cross-cutting' cleavages is that of class and religion, buttressed by auxiliary structures such as churches and trade unions. In pre-war Germany, cross-cutting class and confessional cleavages undermined the stability of the party system 7 but the post-war Federal
Republic is closer to the European norm in that the two crosscutting cleavages generate stability and prevent one dominant cleavage from splitting society along religious or class lines 8 . Thus, the German party system in 2005 was underpinned by a reasonably strong confessional cleavage and a weaker class cleavage that is conditioned by either trade union membership or confessional affiliation 9 .
Other social variables have also had an impact upon the modern German party system, however. In the 1960s, Lipset and Rokkan argued that European party systems were 'frozen' at the introduction of universal male suffrage and thus reflected the pattern of cleavages that were manifest at that point 10 . However, in Germany -as in most other European democracies -the cumulative effect of embourgoisement and social mobility eroded traditional loyalties and by the 1970s created a political opportunity structure 11 for a 'new politics', de-coupled from the old cleavage structures. The way these changes impacted upon European polities varied from country to country, depending on local conditions 12 . In Germany, the combined effects of electoral dealignment 13 and post-materialist value orientations 14 associated with the new politics were to introduce an element of unpredictability previously alien to the cosy political consensus of the post-war Federal Republic. And of course this element of unpredictability was further aggravated by Unification in 1990, which 'injected new uncertainty into this already fluid political environment' 15 . The cumulative impact of the social changes discussed above on (i) the constitution of the 6 party system(s), (ii) the strategic environment they generated, and (ii) the patterns of party political competition and co-operation that arose from them, was profound and far reaching. It is to these themes that the article now turns.
The Constitution of the German Party System(s)
The social developments described in the pervious section are reflected in the development of the German party system(s) over the post-war period. Table 1 demonstrates how the German party system at the national level has developed over Up until the 1980s, the SPD had also enjoyed success in this regard. The party successfully survived the split that followed the Zwangsvereinigung and, by 1953, had successfully neutralised the KPD in West Germany 16 . However, as Table 1 demonstrates, the German party system at the national level was reconstituted through means that the 'national' party system was made up of five parties: the PDS, Greens, SPD, FDP, and CDU/CSU. Second, this five-party system now had a wider ideological range, within which the ideological centre of gravity had shifted leftwards from where it had been for most of the post-war period 17 . Taken in the round, the changes described in this section had a profound affect on the strategic environment in which political parties operated and the patterns of competition and co-operation that this generated. It is to the strategic environment in which political parties operate that the article now turns.
The Strategic Environment
The development and constitution of the German party system(s) has led to the creation of a nation specific set of constraints and incentives that provide the environment within which party elites pursue strategic action. One of the key strategic considerations is the degree of stability within a given party system -a factor that is directly related to the level of fractionalisation within it.
The crudest measure of fractionalisation describes the total number of parties that exist within a party system. In theoretical terms, increased fractionalisation increases in turn the likelihood of 'cycling', by which any potentially winning actor or coalition can be trumped by another alternative 18 . Increased fractionalisation often goes with higher levels of party system polarisation and, again, in theoretical terms, the more polarised the party system the less likely that a winning solution can be found 19 . In West European democracies we have seen an increase in the degree of fractionalisation of party systems since 1980 and the average West European parliament now contains seven political parties. However, a more nuanced measure of fractionalisation is a count of the number of 'effective' parties within a party system (defined as parties that can be expected to have an impact upon the outcome of a legislative 'game') 20 . And using this measure the average West European party system only contains four 'effective' parties 21 .
In practical terms, then, the average West European party system remains relatively stable and this stability is buttressed to a greater or lesser extent by nationspecific system attributes such as voting rules (plurality versus proportional systems), barriers to representation (such as the five percent hurdle at the federal level in Germany), laws regulating internal party democracy, and so on. These institutional variables impose what theorists call a 'structure induced equilibrium' 22 , the dynamics of which vary from country to country.
Writing at around the same time as Shepsle, Gordon Smith 23 highlighted the importance of system attributes, both as means of restraining party system fragmentation and also as means of imposing the structure induced equilibria, noted above, upon them. For Smith, the key system attribute is 'cohesion', a quality which, if present in sufficient quantities, will enhance system stability. There are two types of cohesion, both of which impact upon parties strategic considerations. The first, 'governing' cohesion, determines the effectiveness of government in terms of its longevity, stability, and steering capacity. The second, 'social' cohesion, goes some way to determine the extent to which political parties are able effectively to integrate and aggregate competing societal interests and as a result satisfy voters' preferences and shut out potential competitors. For Smith, the UK-style plurality systemdesigned to produce majoritarian single-party government -is the best suited to deliver both strong, stable government and an integrated electorate. Nevertheless, Smith also held the 1970s German party system in high regard in this respect, After 1983, however, the internal dynamics of the German party system began to change under the pressure of greater party system fragmentation and polarisation.
Again, it will be recalled from Table 1 that 1983 and 1990 saw two critical junctures, in which the German party system fragmented, polarised, and skewed to the political left. The emergence of the Greens and then the PDS has turned the German party system into a genuinely multi-party system in which it is possible and even rational for smaller parties such as themselves to seek out niche positions on the dominant left-right continuum and mobilise around more peripheral segments of what is normally a bell-curve of electoral preferences. In addition, as will be come apparent below, the new party system increasingly failed to function according to the consensual triangular dynamic of the past and now more strongly resembled a relatively polarised 'two-bloc' system, primarily but not exclusively based on the left right ideological dimension. The shape of the new party system is set out in Figure 1 below. In 2005, therefore, the strategic environment described in Figure Two presented both the CDU/CSU and SPD with a strategic dilemma. On the one hand, as 'Catch-all' parties they had no choice but to compete for the median voter by underplaying their ideological side and appealing to the centre of the bell-curve of voter preferences along the dominant left-right ideological dimension. On the other, the mathematics of coalition formation meant that unless they were to enter a Grand Coalition they more than likely had to rely on flanking parties to the left or right in order to form a government, which meant they also had to appeal in that direction.
This dilemma has been particularly problematic for the SPD, which has had to cope 
Patterns of Competition and Co-operation
As noted earlier in this article, in 2005 the German party system displayed a strong territorial cleavage and a wider ideological range, within which the ideological centre of gravity has skewed leftwards. These changes had two main effects on the relative strengths of the parties. First, as discussed earlier, the emergence of a less fluid 'twobloc' system made it harder for any of the smaller parties to assume the pivotal position enjoyed by the FDP before 1983. It appears that this development has enhanced the relative dominance of the Volksparteien, although it will require one or two more Bundestag elections to be sure that this is the case 30 . Second, the skew towards the left has led to the SPD -rather than the FDP -increasingly being the party with the median legislator along the left-right continuum within the legislature. In theoretical terms, this makes the SPD the Mparty, without which no ideologically connected majority coalition can form and which should make it decisive in any coalition game 31 . The shift of the median legislator from FDP to SPD is demonstrated in Table 2 , below. In addition to tracking the shift of Mparty from the FDP to the FDP, Table 2 demonstrates two other points. The first, relatively self-evident, point is that -in keeping with the theoretical predictions noted above -throughout the run of data the Mparty always becomes a member of the winning coalition. The second, more significant, observation is that not only did the SPD become Mparty after the 1998 elections; the outcomes of the 1998 and 2002 coalition negotiations also made it
MpartyK. The term MpartyK refers to a given political party that not only 'owns' the median legislator within the legislature but also the median legislator within the winning coalition. In real world coalition outcomes, the position of the median legislator and the median legislatorK are often different and it would be expected that ceteris paribus subsequent coalition policy positions would fall within the interstices of the preference curves of the median legislator and median legislatorK 32 . The important thing to remember, however, is that any political party which is both Mparty and MpartyK is doubly decisive within the coalition game, in that (i) it should be in all majority ideologically connected coalitions and (ii) subsequent policy outcomes should be close to its ideal position. Because of its size and the ideological range of the coalitions in which it took part, the position of MpartyK was something the FDP was never able to achieve.
Thus, the SPD as Mparty and MpartyK would be expected to enjoy a degree of political leverage within the winning coalition greater than that expected from its Table 3 , below. Table 3 about here Taken in the round, in Table 3 there were a total of eight different parties in the various Land legislatures, ranging from the PDS on the left of the party system to the DVU on the right 36 . But, of these eight parties only the CDU and SPD were present in all 16 Land parliaments; thus confirming the relative dominance of the two Volksparteien 37 . Table 3 also demonstrates the clear territorial cleavage noted earlier.
Thus we find that there were both 'type 1' and 'type 2' party systems at the Land 
Conclusions
So what do the arguments and data discussed in this article demonstrate? In many ways, the picture that emerges is confusing and potentially contradictory. On the one hand, we find higher levels of party system fractionalisation than was the case in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s. At first glance, such party system deconcentration should work against the interests of the two big Volksparteien. Indeed, in the 1980s and early 1990s, the SPD did struggle to adjust to the presence of first one and then two competitors on the left of the party system. For its part, however, the CDU/CSU has managed to prevent the emergence of a sustained challenge on its right flank and thus avoided the strategic difficulties encountered by the SPD.
This article has argued, however, that a closer analysis of party system change in Germany reveals that the strategic environment has actually become more benign for the Volksparteien and in particular the SPD. There are four main reasons for this.
First, the degree of fractionalisation that has taken place has served to make it more difficult for a single small party to assume the 'kingmaker' or 'pivot' role enjoyed by the FDP in the old triangular system. Second, the loss of the kingmaker has both enhanced -and been enhanced by -the emergence of a two-bloc dynamic, in which one of the two Volksparteien almost inevitably dominate each bloc. Third, the emergence and persistence of the new territorial cleavage in the united Germany means that the SPD has managed to forge a modus operandi that allows for competition and/or co-operation with the Greens and PDS in territorially discreet
arenas. This has served to offset the problem generated by the need to compete and co-operate with the two parties along distinct ideological and issue dimensions and has helped the SPD maintain a reasonably credible policy mix. Finally, the skew in the party system to the left has shifted the position of the median legislator to the Wahlen, 1983 Wahlen, , 1987 Wahlen, , 1990 Wahlen, , 1994 Wahlen, , 1998 Wahlen, , 2002 . 
